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6.6. 检查软件包真实性

Falcot 公司的管理极重视安全。因此,他们只安装 Debian 保证无窜改的软件包。电脑怪客可能在合法的软件包内加入若干恶意代码。若安装了这种软件包,就会运行怪客要它做的事,包括泄露密码或隐私信息。为避免这个风险,Debian 有个机制在安装时避免纂改的风险,只安装来自官方维护者的软件包且未经第三方修改。
The seal works with a chain of cryptographic hashes and a signature and is explained in detail in apt-secure(8). Starting with Debian 10 Buster the signed file is the InRelease file, provided by the Debian mirrors. There is also a legacy file called Release. Both contain a list of the Packages files (including their compressed forms, Packages.gz and Packages.xz, and the incremental versions), along with their SHA256 hashes, which ensures that the files haven't been tampered with. These Packages files contain a list of the Debian packages available on the mirror, along with their hashes, which ensures in turn that the contents of the packages themselves haven't been altered either. The difference between InRelease and Release is that the former is cryptographically signed in-line, whereas the latter provides a detached signature in the form of the file Release.gpg.
APT needs a set of trusted GnuPG public keys to verify signatures in the InRelease and Release.gpg files available on the mirrors. It gets them from files in /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/ and from the /etc/apt/trusted.gpg keyring (managed by the apt-key command). The official Debian keys are provided and kept up-to-date by the debian-archive-keyring package which puts them in /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/:
# ls /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/
Once the appropriate keys are in the keyring, APT will check the signatures before any risky operation, so that frontends will display a warning if asked to install a package whose authenticity can't be ascertained.
Note, that binary packages are usually not signed. The integrity of a package can only be confirmed by checking its hashsums against a trusted (and possibly signed) hashsum source.