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[SECURITY] [DSA 3125-1] openssl security update



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Debian Security Advisory DSA-3125-1                   security@debian.org
http://www.debian.org/security/                      Salvatore Bonaccorso
January 11, 2015                       http://www.debian.org/security/faq
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Package        : openssl
CVE ID         : CVE-2014-3569 CVE-2014-3570 CVE-2014-3571 CVE-2014-3572 
                 CVE-2014-8275 CVE-2015-0204 CVE-2015-0205 CVE-2015-0206

Multiple vulnerabilities have been discovered in OpenSSL, a Secure
Sockets Layer toolkit. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project
identifies the following issues:

CVE-2014-3569

    Frank Schmirler reported that the ssl23_get_client_hello function in
    OpenSSL does not properly handle attempts to use unsupported
    protocols. When OpenSSL is built with the no-ssl3 option and a SSL
    v3 ClientHello is received, the ssl method would be set to NULL which
    could later result in a NULL pointer dereference and daemon crash.

CVE-2014-3570

    Pieter Wuille of Blockstream reported that the bignum squaring
    (BN_sqr) may produce incorrect results on some platforms, which
    might make it easier for remote attackers to defeat cryptographic
    protection mechanisms.

CVE-2014-3571

    Markus Stenberg of Cisco Systems, Inc. reported that a carefully
    crafted DTLS message can cause a segmentation fault in OpenSSL due
    to a NULL pointer dereference. A remote attacker could use this flaw
    to mount a denial of service attack.

CVE-2014-3572

    Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA reported that an
    OpenSSL client would accept a handshake using an ephemeral ECDH
    ciphersuite if the server key exchange message is omitted. This
    allows remote SSL servers to conduct ECDHE-to-ECDH downgrade attacks
    and trigger a loss of forward secrecy.

CVE-2014-8275

    Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen of the Codenomicon CROSS project
    and Konrad Kraszewski of Google reported various certificate
    fingerprint issues, which allow remote attackers to defeat a
    fingerprint-based certificate-blacklist protection mechanism.

CVE-2015-0204

    Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA reported that
    an OpenSSL client will accept the use of an ephemeral RSA key in a
    non-export RSA key exchange ciphersuite, violating the TLS
    standard. This allows remote SSL servers to downgrade the security
    of the session.

CVE-2015-0205

    Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA reported that an
    OpenSSL server will accept a DH certificate for client
    authentication without the certificate verify message. This flaw
    effectively allows a client to authenticate without the use of a
    private key via crafted TLS handshake protocol traffic to a server
    that recognizes a certification authority with DH support.

CVE-2015-0206

    Chris Mueller discovered a memory leak in the dtls1_buffer_record
    function. A remote attacker could exploit this flaw to mount a
    denial of service through memory exhaustion by repeatedly sending
    specially crafted DTLS records.

For the stable distribution (wheezy), these problems have been fixed in
version 1.0.1e-2+deb7u14.

For the upcoming stable distribution (jessie), these problems will be
fixed soon.

For the unstable distribution (sid), these problems have been fixed in
version 1.0.1k-1.

We recommend that you upgrade your openssl packages.

Further information about Debian Security Advisories, how to apply
these updates to your system and frequently asked questions can be
found at: https://www.debian.org/security/

Mailing list: debian-security-announce@lists.debian.org
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