Supermajority requirement off-by-one error, and TC chairmanship
The Technical Committee (and those interested in the libc's resolver
behaviour) are having some trouble because of an off-by-one error in
the supermajority specification in recent versions of the
constitution.
This was discussed in
http://lists.debian.org/debian-ctte/2004/05/msg00027.html
and has recently caused trouble for an actual vote.
To give a clear and simple hypothetical example: suppose 120
developers vote on constitutional amendment GR, with a simple Y vs. FD
ballot (requires 3:1). Suppose the quorum is met and 90 vote in
favour and 30 against.
Then according to the current wording, Y fails to defeat FD by 3:1
because 90 is exactly 3 times 30, whereas the requirement from A.6 is
that it should be strictly greater.
This causes the most trouble for small electorates, obviously - of
which the TC is the chief example. It seems clear to me that the TC's
`3:1 supermajority' requirement as stated in 6.1(4) should be read as
intended to allow the TC to override if (say) three TC members vote in
favour and one against.
Also, read literally, A.6(3) seems to always eliminate the default
option since it never strictly defeats itself (!) This isn't a very
reasonable interpretation but is another reason why the bug should be
fixed.
I suggest the following wording:
* Replace `strictly greater than' with `at least' in A.6(3)(2).
The result reads:
2. An option A defeats the default option D by a
majority ratio N, if V(A,D) is at least N * V(D,A).
The immediate effect of this is that options which are tied with
the default option are not dropped; options with a supermajority
requirement are likewise not dropped if they exactly meet the
supermajority requirement.
This has two practical consequences:
Firstly, the off-by-one error in supermajorities is fixed: if the
number of Yes voters is exactly 3x or 2x (as the case may be)
the number of FD voters, the resolution is considered successful.
(In a vote with no cycles and where a position option meets a
supermajority, FD will be eliminated from the Schwartz set by
A.6(6).)
Secondly, where there is a casting vote, it allows the elector with
the casting vote to choose between FD and Yes if they are tied.
While we're looking at this text, the use of `defeat' is slightly
confusing, and made more so by this change, because the criterion for
defeating the default option in the new A.6(3) is different from the
definition of defeat provided in A.6(4). So I propose one other
change to go along with this:
* Change to `defeat [the default option]' throughout A.6(3) to
`overcome'. That gives:
Any (non-default) option which does not overcome the default
option by its required majority ratio is dropped from
consideration.
1. Given two options A and B, V(A,B) is the number of voters
who prefer option A over option B.
2. An option A overcomes the default option D by a majority
ratio N, if V(A,D) is at least N * V(D,A).
3. If a supermajority of S:1 is required for A, its majority
ratio is S; otherwise, its majority ratio is 1.
Additionally, the TC had considered experimenting with the idea of
rotating the post of TC Chairman, to try to make things a bit more
dynamic. However it's not clear with the current constititution that
the TC has the power to (for example) set out a timetable specifying
the chairman at various times.
So I would like to suggest replacing 6.1(7) with something like:
7. Appoint the Chairman of the Technical Committee
The Committee may by resolution specify which of its members is
its Chairman. If it does not do so, or circumstances arise which
are incompatible with the resolution, the Chairmanship is vacant
until this situation is remedied.
/Rationale: For example, the Committee might establish a schedule
for a rotating Chairman, or appoint a Deputy to take over under
specified conditions./
Ian.
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